A Beginner’s Guide to Armed Resistance Movements in DR Congo.

In the previous installment, we looked into the historical roots of armed resistance movements in DR Congo. You can get yourself up to speed here.

Part Two: Old Playing Field, New Players.

At the time of Mobutu’s death in September 1997, DR Congo (then known as Zaire) alongside much of the Central African region was in a precarious state. The Rwandan Genocide had far-reaching consequences across the region and its aftermath was threatening to destabilize many of the countries in the region. The region now had to deal with a massive influx of refugees in addition to the unwanted international attention that the conflict had brought.

Mobutu’s iron grip on power in Zaire had faded and he was forced to flee to Morocco where he eventually died of prostate cancer. Laurent Kabila, a rebellious strongman to Mobutu’s government had risen to power but the situation was far from resolved. Everyone wanted, not just a piece of the pie, but the whole meal.

The DR Congo Headache.

DR Congo has been a notoriously tough territory to administer ever since the colonial days. Administering any form of central authority is difficult. This can be attributed to several factors;

• The hinterland of DR Congo is hard to get to. A vast swathe of the country is covered by the Congo Forest, the second-largest tropical jungle after the Amazon. Building roads, railways and other infrastructure that allows for ease of administration is close to impossible. Corruption is also rife in the country; which means that the resources that could have been utilized to construct this infrastructure have been continually squandered and mismanaged over the years.

• The capital of the country, Kinshasa, is located to the very western edge of the country on the Atlantic coast. Building a capital city in the center of the country is incredibly tough, much because of the reason listed above, as it that would require building infrastructure that links to and away from it.
• Much of the country’s security challenges stem from the Eastern provinces. Given that the seat of power is located on the opposite periphery of the country, dealing with these challenges becomes incredibly difficult. The situation is further complicated by the aforementioned lack of crosslinking infrastructure that would connect both ends of the country’s territorial expanse, allowing for a fastidious response by government forces in the event of any security threat.

• The country is made of many ethnic groups, each of whom wishes to gain control of power and resources. Many of the militias and armed groups in the country, particularly those in the eastern provinces have ethnical roots and these ethnic differences have fueled many of the conflicts in the region.
• External influence is a key contributor to the perpetual nature of conflicts that occur in the region. The Tutsi and Hutus living in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu have had a protracted conflict between them from the days of the Rwandan genocide. The Tutsi-majority Rwandan government has been long involved in the region’s conflict as it aims to quash the Hutu rebels who operate across its border. Many of the belligerents in this conflict have had their fair share of allies from the region, the African continent and global powers.
• The external attention to the eastern provinces of DR Congo is particularly because of the superfluous supply of precious, natural resources that are abundant in the region. Control over the extraction and export of these resources which include copper, industrial diamonds and cobalt ore is a huge source of revenue. Most of these resources remained unearthed and untapped and estimated to be worth about $24 trillion. For years, various organized groups have benefitted from the extraction and sale of these resources and the income has often been reinvested into further fueling the conflict.

The First and Second Congo Wars.

The First Congo War began in 1996 when Laurent Kabila launched a military offensive under the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo (ADFL) to Kinshasa to depose Mobutu from power. Kabila enjoyed strong external support, particularly from Uganda and Rwanda, both of whom were displeased by Mobutu’s accommodation of rebel groups within the country. However, Kabila’s reputation quickly sank back down as he found himself caught between a rock and a hard place.

The massive external help he had received saw him branded as a puppet and he was forced to expel the external powers that had allowed him to ascend to power. Rwanda and Uganda quickly switched support to other rebel forces such as the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) respectively.

By 1998, Kabila was teetering at the edge of losing out to the upsurge of these rebel forces. The Second Congo War was now in full swing and Kabila had forced to enlist the support of allies within the continent. He received much-needed military support, particularly from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe who managed to help him sustain control over the country. However, a vast swathe of the Eastern provinces had now fallen to the rebel factions who were receiving logistical and financial support from Rwanda and Uganda. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999 did little to whittle down the conflict and armed resistance continued.

On 16^th January 2001, Laurent Kabila was shot and killed by one of his bodyguards in Kinshasa. His son Joseph Kabila took over control of the country. Joseph, unlike his father, was seen as being more proactive in the peace process and was committed to ending the violence that was tearing his country apart. As a result, the peace process was more proactive.

The Pretoria Accords were signed between DR Congo and Rwanda in July 2002 and the Luanda Agreements between DR Congo and Uganda in September of the same year. All parties committed to a plan for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all warring factions, and a withdrawal of external forces from DR Congo. A transitional government was formed in 2003 and the first Democratic elections since 1960 were held in the country on 31^st July 2006.

DR Congo has been under the control of a centralized authority since then. Despite these efforts towards the establishment of peace within the country, the situation is far from resolved. Peace continues to remain to be incredibly elusive within the country.

The Nature of Armed Resistance in DR Congo.

The March 23 Movement (M-23).

Perhaps the most infamous of the militia groups to emerge out of DR Congo in recent history, M-23 is a resistance group of fighters comprising of a majority Tutsi ethnicity. It is based in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu. The group was formed on 4^th April 2012 by an initial crop of 300 soldiers from the national army who had mutinied and rebelled against the government.

A majority of the soldiers were initially aligned to the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), a rebel group that had dissolved and its members absorbed into the army as part of the peace process in the country.

CNDP’s founding generals had been involved in the First Congo War, fighting alongside Kabila’s forces under the Rally for Congolese Democracy- Goma (RCD-Goma). As the conflict escalated into the Second Congo War, the group rebelled against Kabila’s government and began to mount rebel attacks in the Goma region. CNDP was eventually founded in 2007 by General Laurent Nkunda, an influential Tutsi rebel leader operating in the Kivu provinces.

CNDP enjoyed direct support from the Rwanda Patriotic Force (RPF) as its emergence quashed the influence of various Hutu rebel groups that had fought in the Rwandan genocide. These rebel groups were regrouping and reorganizing after fleeing from the established Tutsi government in Rwanda.

These splinter rebel groups that had fought in the genocide as the Interahamwe found perfect breeding grounds upon fleeing into DR Congo. Kagame’s government was keen to end their resurgence by all means. Therefore, Tutsi militia groups such as CNDP helped to keep many of the Hutu rebels in check, who by then had managed to reorganize themselves into the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).

CNDP was led by Laurent Nkunda, a Tutsi who had fought in the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) during the Rwandan genocide. He eventually moved back to DR Congo, his country of birth, where he staged various rebellions against Mobutu’s government. Nkunda eventually fought in the First and Second Congo Wars under RCD-Goma and was initially offered a position in the transitional government of 2003, which he declined.

Nkunda feared that this would be used to lure him out and to be charged under the International Criminal Court (ICC). His chief of staff, Bosco Ntaganda was an equally well-decorated army general. Nkunda and Ntaganda were the most influential members of the CNDP.

By 2008, CNDP had become too much of a force to contain in eastern DR Congo and hence, a secret brokerage was reached between the governments of DR Congo and Rwanda. DR Congo would cease aiding the Hutu rebels operating on the Rwandan border and Rwanda would withdraw support for Nkunda in addition to sending forces over the border to quash FDLR forces.

Nkunda was granted passage in Rwanda where he was subsequently arrested by Rwandese authorities. His arrest led to the decline of CNDP and the group was forced to demilitarize in 2009. Much of the fighting force was integrated into the army or the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo(FARDC) as it is officially referred to. CNDP also became a political party as per the peace accords that were signed on 23^rd March 2009.

On that fateful day in April 2012, part of the army stationed in North Kivu that was initially aligned to CNDP rebelled citing neglect by the Kinshasa government, an unfair election in 2011 and the failure of adherence to the accords that had been signed on 23^rd March 2009. This rebel movement came to be known as the March 23 Movement or M-23 in short. At the helm was their ‘decorated’ general, Bosco Ntaganda.

The rebels evaded government forces for much of the year even as President Kabila continued to call for Ntaganda’s arrest. In what was an embarrassing spell for FARDC, M-23 forces invaded Goma in November 2012, making light work of the larger army forces surrounding the city and neighbouring towns.

M-23 forces withdrew in December only after much international intervention. It took the indulgence of 11 governments for a subsequent peace agreement to be reached in February 2013. A huge bulk of M-23 forces surrendered to Ugandan forces on the condition that they would be granted safe passage back to DR Congo and that Tutsis within FARDC would receive better treatment.

M-23 managed to attract global attention and headlines in the relatively short tenure of its existence. Bosco Ntaganda, the man believed to be the initial founder, eventually turned himself over to the US Embassy in Kigali, Rwanda in March 2013. He was consequently extradited to the ICC where he faced several counts of rape, murder and the recruitment of child soldiers. He was eventually jailed for 30 years.

Sultani Makenga, who was widely understood to be second-in-command to Ntaganda, promptly took over. His first plan of action was to depose the ‘political leader’ of the movement, Bishop Jean Marie Runiga who was viewed as a hard-liner and uncommitted to negotiations and the peace process. Runiga was eventually arrested by Rwandese authorities upon crossing the border to Rwanda.

M-23 managed to stay dormant for about five years seeing as many of its leaders and fighters had relocated to Uganda. However, Makenga and some of the higher-ranking members of the rebel group had seemingly ‘disappeared’ from Uganda in 2017 only to reemerge back in DR Congo. M-23 seemingly reemerged out of the shadows in 2021 following fresh support and funding from Rwanda and began reconquering territory.

M-23 is a globally recognized terrorist organization and Rwanda had been under massive international pressure to pull its funding from it in the earlier days. However, the continued emergence of Hutu rebels on the DR Congo border and the seeming cosiness between Uganda and DR Congo had prompted Kagame to pull out his trump card and openly resume his support for M-23. The harsh diplomatic stand-off between Kigali and Kinshasa escalated quite quickly with the Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi comparing Kagame to Hitler.

Makenga and the rest of M-23 cited a lack of adherence to the 2013 peace agreements as the main reason for their re-emergence. M-23 continues to operate in the region, albeit being less influential than it once was. The days of M-23 have since paved the way for the various loose coalitions of belligerents committing similar if not worse atrocities in the region. There are no less than 120 armed resistance groups in the region, with more than seventy existing in the Kivu provinces alone. Most of the casualties in the region today are inflicted by one of two armed militias; The Allied Democratic Force (ADF) and the Cooperation for the Development of Congo (CODECO).

The Allied Democratic Force (ADF)

ADF is an Islamist militant group that traces its origin to Ugandan rebels opposed to Museveni’s rule. It was initially established from a loose coalition of rebel forces under the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU). However, it continually evolved and managed to move away from a rebel group aimed at liberating Uganda to a religiously extremist group.

ADF has been responsible for targeted attacks across the Ruwenzori mountains to terrorize civilian populations in eastern DR Congo through mass bombings, mass shootings and kidnappings. It is sometimes referred to as the Islamic State in Congo (ISIC) due to its supposed ties to ISIS.

However, the group is mostly made up of Hutu sympathizers. It is estimated to be responsible for the murders of at least 6,000 civilians since 2013.

The Cooperation for the Development of Congo (CODECO)

The emergence of CODECO as a militant organization is quite interesting, to say the least. It was initially formed in the 1970s as a peaceful agricultural cooperative society within the Lendu community in the Ituri province. By the time of the Second Congo War, however, the organization had transformed to become an organized militant group due to the emergence of the Ituri Conflict.

The Ituri Conflict is sometimes referred to as the ‘War within a war’. Much like every other conflict situation we have examined so far, this one too is tied to ethnic roots. During the Second Congo War, the main rebel group to Kabila’s administration, RCD-Kisangani (itself a splinter from the main RCD coalition), was facing a lot of in-fighting among its generals. Much of the infighting entailed control over the resource-rich Orientale province.

The Ugandan forces responsible for overseeing the coordination of the rebel movement split the eastern Orientale province and created the Ituri province, before appointing a governor from the Hema community to govern over it. This action displeased fighters from the Lendu community who organized themselves into ethnic militia groups, such as CODECO and FRPI (Force for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri).

CODECO’s militant activities stem from actions of disgruntled Lendus looking to push for the return of land and the redistribution of resources that have been disproportionately allocated to the Hemas. The peace process in DR Congo had managed to a stalemate between the two communities for years, but renewed clashes and instances of violence emerged in 2017. Despite the killing of its supposed leader Justin “Mountain Wolf” Ngudjolo by FARDC in 2020, CODECO remains an active militia group in the region.

Conclusion: Why dealing with armed resistance movements in DR Congo is an unsurmountable task.

The armed resistance in DR Congo, particularly in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North and South Kivu and Tanganyika stems from a myriad of complex issues. Much of the conflict stems from the ethnic tensions fostered by control of land, resources and political power. However, each situation as highlighted by the specific instances of the three aforementioned militia groups is unique.

M-23’s emergence was largely politically motivated and orchestrated. The ADF leans more toward religious extremism and CODECO toward more ‘traditional’ issues of control over resources. It is this complexity that makes diffusing the conflict situation in the region that much harder.

When King Leopold II took control over the then Congo Free State, his primary concern was with control of the extraction of mineral resources. The situation has hardly changed since then. The region is rich and minerals and it lacks a governing authority that supervises their extraction in a way that is beneficial to the country’s economy. Therefore, despite having access to some of the world’s most precious resources, the country cannot utilize and benefit from trading with them. Ironically, DR Congo is the world’s richest country in terms of resources but among the poorest in terms of its economic standing.

Every year, the country loses billions of dollars in potential revenue from the illegal extraction and sale of these minerals. Mobutu’s kleptocratic system was quickly hijacked by a few oligarchs upon his removal from office. These wealthy elites not only have a chokehold on government but also on the established mineral trade, pocketing the vast majority of the income and leaving breadcrumbs for the rest of the country to share.

In recent years, the DR Congo government has been opening up its mining industry to external mining companies, particularly from established global powers such as France, the United States and China. Collusion with government officials allows these companies to skirt regulations in paying taxes and taking responsibility for their mining activities. Consequently, this has created a situation where the country is exploited for its mineral reserves, all while receiving little if any compensation.

Despite the highly profitable mining activity in the region, eastern DR Congo is highly underdeveloped.

Rebel groups also control various mines and the extractive process of the minerals by engaging in the black market. They may either exchange these minerals for arms and supplies or sell them directly and use the generated revenue to finance their activities.

Foreign governments, particularly Rwanda and Uganda, have also been accused of using their military presence to assert control over the mineral trade to generate revenue for themselves.

The proliferation of arms has also allowed for the emergence of more militia groups within the regions. The global arms trade thrives in situations such as one in DR Congo. Despite the collective actions towards disarmament in the region, there are just too many guns to go around. Therefore, conflict is much more likely to escalate when access to arms is made all the more accessible.

The response by international armed coalitions has always been slow and seemingly uncoordinated for years. Back in the early 1960s during the Congo Crisis, it was the slow response and intervention by the United Nations that led to the assassination of Patrice Lumumba.  Many years later, the slow response by the United Nations to simmering tensions in Rwanda led to the death of many innocent lives during the Rwandan genocide. The events of this genocide eventually stirred the waters and consequently led to the First and Second Congo Wars.

Even when a peacekeeping force was established as the United Nations Mission in the Congo (MONUC and later MONUSCO), little still has changed. MONUSCO has continually come under fire for its slow response in protecting civilians from crossfires of armed conflict. Upon the reemergence of the M-23 rebels, the DR Congo government faulted MONUSCO forces for their slow response in effectively dealing with the rebels. All in all, the DR Congo government eventually called for an earlier withdrawal of MONUSCO forces in the region. The EAC also called back its forces under EACRF, citing the dissatisfaction and disgruntlement from Kinshasa. The DR Congo government is not exonerated either in its handling of the situation.

All in all, understanding what motivates the emergence of armed resistance groups is the key to resolving the conflict in the region. At the most basic level, ethnic and communal identity is at the heart of fueling and motivating the emergence of most of the conflict. Many of these armed resistance movements are formed from communally organized militant groups or as they are more commonly referred to the ‘Mai-Mai’. Each community will want to have political control as that guarantees that they have control over the sharing of resources. Squabbling with another community with similar needs and wants will cause the conflict to escalate to a regional level, then to a national level, and at the international level.

It should be remembered that borders are just artificial lines we have drawn in our heads and at the end of the day, learning to coexist with those we live next to is the only way to avoid conflict. That is why diplomacy needs to take centerstage at all levels; from the communal to the international level. Everyone must be willing to negotiate and to compromise so that the other gains and in so doing, everyone gains!